Transnational Fiduciary Law in Bond Markets: A Case Study by Renner, Moritz
UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative 
Law 
Volume 5 Volume 5 (2020) Symposium: 
Transnational Fiduciary Law Article 6 
4-7-2020 
Transnational Fiduciary Law in Bond Markets: A Case Study 
Moritz Renner 
University of Mannheim 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucijil 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Renner, Moritz (2020) "Transnational Fiduciary Law in Bond Markets: A Case Study," UC Irvine Journal of 
International, Transnational, and Comparative Law: Vol. 5, 93. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucijil/vol5/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of UCI 
Law Scholarly Commons. 
    93 
Transnational Fiduciary Law in Bond Markets:  
A Case Study 
By Moritz Renner* 
Centering on a case study, this Article discusses the legal aspects of “net-short debt 
investing” on global bond markets through the lens of transnational fiduciary law. The aim of the 
Article is twofold. On the one hand, it is a comparative study on the potential and limitations of 
fiduciary law in a “hard case.” This analysis is inductive in nature. It aims at contributing to a 
better understanding of fiduciary law doctrines in both common and civil law jurisdictions. On the 
other hand, the Article focuses on the specific challenges of fiduciary law in transnational settings. 
In particular, it analyses the influence of transnational private ordering on the establishment of 
fiduciary duties in state law. The Article makes the case that the concept of fiduciary duties should 
be interpreted with a view to facilitating mechanisms of private ordering. 
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The aim of this Article is twofold. On the one hand, it is a comparative 
study on the potential benefits and limitations of fiduciary law in a “hard case.” 
This analysis is inductive in nature. It aims at contributing to a better understanding 
of fiduciary law doctrines in both common and civil law jurisdictions. On the other 
hand, the Article focuses on the specific challenges of fiduciary law in transnational 
settings. In particular, it analyzes the influence of transnational private ordering on 
the establishment of fiduciary duties in state law. 
                         UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L.      [Vol. 5:93  94
  
Centering on a case study, the Article discusses the legal aspects of “net-
short debt investing” on global bond markets through the lens of transnational 
fiduciary law. Generally, the term “net-short” refers to the positioning of an 
investor who benefits as the price of a specific financial asset decreases. Net-short 
debt investing is an increasingly popular investment strategy which enables 
bondholders (i.e. holders of a company’s debt) to cash in on the default of the 
bond-issuing company by building up a net-short position in credit default swaps 
(infra II). The strategy raises the question whether the net-short investor has a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty towards (1) the issuer of the bond, (2) other bondholders 
and (3) the counterparty of the credit default swap (infra III). This legal question 
has a transnational dimension: large-scale bond sales do not only involve a number 
of different jurisdictions; they also heavily build on mechanisms of private ordering 
(infra IV). 
The Article argues that any legal reconstruction of net-short debt investing 
must consider this transnational dimension (infra V). Specifically, the Article will 
make the case that the concept of fiduciary duties should be interpreted with a view 
to facilitating mechanisms of transnational private ordering. 
II. CASE STUDY: NET-SHORT DEBT INVESTING 
The problems of net-short debt investing have recently received 
considerable media attention: the Financial Times sees USA Inc. face “a growing 
threat from activist investors,” whereas others critically discuss the role of “hedge-
fund debt cops.”1 Even more pointedly, an opinion piece in the New York Times 
claims, What Hedge Funds Consider a Win is a Disaster for Everyone Else.2 What, then, is 
net-short debt investing? The phenomenon is well illustrated by the much-
discussed Windstream v. Aurelius case, which has recently been decided by a New 
York District Court.3 In short, the (stylized) facts of the case are as follows: 
In 2013 Windstream, a telecoms company, issued bonds in order to finance 
its operations. As is standard market practice, the bond documentation contained 
a number of so-called covenants. Bond covenants, as an instrument of creditor 
protection, are clauses that oblige the bond-issuer to comply with certain financial 
ratios, such as a specific debt-to-earnings ratio, and to refrain from risky financial 
activities.4 One of the bond covenants prohibited that Windstream transfers any 
assets to affiliated companies. Windstream violated this prohibition when it 
transferred a considerable number of its network services to a holding company in 
2015, allegedly for regulatory purposes. Given this violation of a covenant, the 
bondholders, with a quorum of 25 %, would have been entitled to declare an “event 
 
* Moritz Renner is Professor of Civil Law, International and European Commercial Law, University 
of Mannheim. 
1  Sujeet Indap, USA Inc. Faces Growing Threat from Activist Debt Investors, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Sept. 18, 2018) at 13; Mary Childs, Windstream Dispute Highlights Aurelius’ Role as a Hedge-Fund Debt 
Cop, BARRON’S (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/windstream-dispute-highlights 
-aurelius-role-as-a-hedge-fund-debt-cop-1535750611. 
2  William D. Cohan, What Hedge Funds Consider a Win Is a Disaster for Everyone Else, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 12, 2019). 
3  U.S. Bank Nat‘l Association v. Windstream Services, LLC, No. 12-CV-7857 (JMF), 2019 
WL 948120 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019). The case was brought by the indenture trustee, U.S. Bank 
National Association, on behalf of the bondholders. The trusteeship arrangement between U.S. 
Bank National Association and the bondholders raises no issues of fiduciary law in the case at hand. 
4  3 PHILIP R. WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS, GUARANTEES, LEGAL OPINIONS § 
5–001, at 69 (2d ed. 2007). 
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of default” after a 60-day cure period and demand immediate repayment of the 
bonds (acceleration).5 
However, the bondholders took no action after Windstream violated the 
covenant. This inactivity was in line with common bond market practice. Triggering 
an event of default and accelerating repayment of the bond is considered the 
bondholders’ “nuclear option,” as it almost invariably leads to the bankruptcy of 
the bond-issuer. Thus, bondholders mostly use covenant violations as bargaining 
chips for adjusting the financial conditions of the bond and restructuring the 
company’s debt rather than enforce the clauses by demanding immediate 
repayment (infra IV). In this regard, the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute is special. 
Aurelius, a US hedge fund, bought 25 % of the Windstream bonds in 2017, i.e. well 
after the covenant violation. It then took swift action by declaring an event of 
default and demanding immediate repayment of the bond, causing Windstream to 
fall into bankruptcy. Why did Aurelius act this way? According to unproven market 
rumors, Aurelius had simultaneously built a net-short position on Windstream’s 
debt by buying credit default swaps (CDS) worth 10 times the amount of its bond 
exposure. Thus, Windstream’s default—which Aurelius had triggered itself (a so-
called “manufactured default”) —allowed Aurelius to cash in on the credit default 
swaps. Aurelius effectively relied on the letter of the bond covenant in order to 
benefit from Windstream’s bankruptcy. 
For Aurelius, this strategy certainly made business sense. Whether it made 
sense from a broader economic perspective seems rather questionable, given that 
Windstream as the bond-issuer (as well as its shareholders and employees), other 
bondholders and the counterparty of Aurelius’ credit default swaps all stood to lose. 
On the other hand, one could argue that broader market benefits in the form of 
deterrence effects for potential covenant violators achieved through Aurelius’ 
“policing” role outweigh these individual losses. As a matter of law, the question is 
what duties Aurelius had towards other market participants (infra III). Both the 
economic and the legal assessment of the case, however, are contingent upon the 
structure of transnational bond markets and the reasonable expectations of market 
participants (infra IV). This Article argues that fiduciary law can play an important 
role in translating market structures and expectations into legal categories. 
 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
As the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute shows, the legal implications of net-
short debt investing concern at least three different relationships: the relationships 
between bondholder and issuer (infra 1), within the group of bondholders (infra 2) 
as well as between bondholder, and CDS counterparty (infra 3). To each of these 
relationships, different laws may apply under conflict-of-laws rules. The legal 
framing of the relationships might particularly differ between common law and civil 
law jurisdictions. 
A. Between Bondholder and Issuer 
In the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute, the bonds were issued under New York 
law. Depending on the nationality of the issuer and the relevant market, bonds are 
subject to different applicable laws. For German companies, for example, it is 
common that bonds are issued under German law, even if the majority of investors 
 
5  Section 6.02 of the bond indenture provided that if an event of default occurs, “the Trustee 
or the Holders of at least 25% in principal amount of the then outstanding Notes may declare all 
the Notes to be due and payable immediately by notice in writing to the Issuers specifying the Event 
of Default.” 
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is domiciled in other jurisdictions. In any case, the bond covenants will likely be 
based on transnational standard documentation (infra IV). 
1. Common Law 
Under New York law, Windstream seemed to have no effective defense 
against Aurelius’ strategy. In the District Court’s conclusions of law, Judge Furman 
elaborates that the court’s “sole task is to enforce the Indenture’s plain terms.”6 
From a common law perspective, this approach seems justified in principle. Under 
the common law of contracts, “good faith does not envision loyalty to the 
contractual counterparty but rather faithfulness to the scope, purpose, and terms 
of the parties’ contract.”7 There is no general doctrine of abuse of rights, but “if 
one has a right to do an act, then one can, in general, do it for whatever reason one 
wishes.”8 These general considerations, however, are of limited import in the field 
of business law, where the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as the model code 
for commercial transactions expressly incorporates the principle of good faith. 
Thus, some courts and commentators have relied on the principle of good 
faith in order to establish lender liability in a wide array of banking law cases. In 
several decisions, both federal and state courts have held that a lender’s right to 
accelerate or terminate a loan may only be exercised in good faith.9 These decisions 
were mostly based on the state-law adoptions of sec. 1-309 U.C.C.10.11 Under these 
standards, courts tend to allow the use of acceleration and termination provisions 
in loan contracts only as a “shield” rather than a “sword.”12 Violations of good faith 
duties by the lender can give rise to contract claims for damages or potentially also 
tort-based lender liability.13 Substantively, the duty of good faith imposes a standard 
of “commercial reasonableness” on the lender.14  It seems highly questionable, 
however, whether such a standard would have enjoined Aurelius from accelerating 
the repayment of the bond in our case. If we merely look at Windstream and 
Aurelius as two parties in a lending relationship, Aurelius did have a legitimate 
interest in enforcing the covenant after it was breached by Windstream. 
 
6  U.S. Bank Nat‘l Association, 2019 WL 948120, at 23. 
7  ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC., 50 A.3d 
434, 430–31 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
8  Jack Beatson, Public Law Influences in Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN 
CONTRACT LAW 266–67 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (quoting Allen v. Flood 
[1891] AC 1). 
9  E.g., State Nat’l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); K.M.C. Co. 
v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). 
10  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.309 (West 2003) (“A term providing that one party or 
that party's successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or 
additional collateral ‘at will’ or when the party ‘deems itself insecure,’ or words of similar import, 
means that the party has power to do so only if that party in good faith believes that the prospect 
of payment or performance is impaired.”). 
11  E.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (West 2003). 
12  Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979); cf., Cheryl Anderson, Breach 
of Good Faith in Lending and Related Theories, 64 N. D. L. REV. 273, 313 (1988). 
13  Alan A. Blakeboro & Rex Heesemann, Good Faith Duties and Tort Remedies in Lender Liability 
Litigation, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1988); James Mabry Vickery, A Special Relationship: The Use of the 
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Impose Tort Damages in Contracts between Lender and Borrower, 9 REV. 
OF LITIG. 93 (1990). For a purely contracts-based solution, see Sandra Chutorian, Tort Remedies for 
Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 402–06 (1986). 
14  Jonathan K. Van Patten, Lender Liability: Changing or Enforcing the Ground Rules, 33 S. D. L. 
REV. 387, 407 (1988). 
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Beyond the principle of good faith,15 far-reaching duties of loyalty may be 
imposed on the parties when there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties,16 
i.e. when one of the parties “is under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit 
of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”17 In such a relationship, 
the fiduciary has specific obligations to the extent that the beneficiary “would be 
justified in expecting loyal conduct.”18 From this perspective, the legal evaluation 
of the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute hinges on the question whether Aurelius was a 
fiduciary of Windstream and whether it had a fiduciary duty (of loyalty) to refrain 
from enforcing the bond covenant.  
The particular question of bondholders’ fiduciary duties towards the issuer 
has apparently not been discussed in banking law literature. Most related articles 
focus on the inverse situation. They ask—mostly from a corporate governance 
perspective—whether the management of the issuer has fiduciary duties towards 
bondholders. 19  Our case, however, seems much more closely related to 
constellations where fiduciary duties are imposed on a bank or other debt investors 
based on their particular role as a lender. 
As there is no general doctrine of fiduciary duties in banking law, courts and 
commentators tend to assume fiduciary duties of banks only if either the bank acted 
as an agent/trustee or under “special circumstances.”20 In the lending business, 
“special circumstances” mostly refer to situations that deviate from the model of 
an arm’s length relationship between creditor and debtor.21 Thus, banks as lenders 
have fiduciary duties towards the borrower if they have “control or an 
informational advantage over the borrower.”22 Most examples in point concern 
cases where banks acted outside of their usual lending role, e.g. by giving advice 
that the borrower relied upon.23 
Does the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute fall under this category of cases? It 
might be argued that a “special circumstance” could be that Aurelius, by virtue of 
holding 25 % of the bonds, had particular leverage over Aurelius as it was able to 
trigger an event of default at will. On the other hand, however, Windstream itself 
had violated the bond covenant. Aurelius did not overstep the contractual 
boundaries of its role as a lender. Quite to the contrary, it availed itself of a 
contractual right that expressly aimed at safeguarding its financial interests. Thus, 
the case for establishing a fiduciary duty that would enjoin Aurelius from triggering 
a default seems rather weak. Even those who argue for a broad application of 
 
15  This complementarity reflects the origins of fiduciary law in equity. On this aspect, see 
Cecil J. Hunt, The Price of Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 
29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 728–29 (1994). 
16  Beatson, supra note 8, at 267. 
17  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 874 cmt. a (AM LAW INST. 1979). 
18  Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and their 
Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936 (2006). 
19  Cf., e.g., David M. W. Harvey, Bondholders’ Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 1023 (1991); George S. Corey, M. W. Marr, Jr. & Michael F. Spivey, Are Bondholders 
Owed a Fiduciary Duty?, 18 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 971 (1991). 
20  Andrew F. Tuch, Fiduciary Principles in Banking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW 125, 127 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); Hunt, supra note 15, at 739–50. However, there is 
an argument to be made that the lender-borrower relationship necessarily has fiduciary elements 
that give rise to corresponding duties, cf. Hunt, supra note 15, at 723–27. 
21  Tuch, supra note 20, at 127. 
22  Id. at 127–28. 
23  E.g., Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp., 622 A.2d 708 (Me. 1993); Buxcel v. First Fidelity 
Bank, 601 N.W.2d 593 (S.D. 1999). 
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fiduciary duties in lending relationships do not discuss a restriction of the lender’s 
termination rights.24 
2. Civil Law 
Had Windstream issued the bond under German law, the legal situation 
would have been quite different at the outset. As in most civil law jurisdictions, 
there is no elaborate doctrine of fiduciary duties in German law.25 However, there 
are functional equivalents to such duties with a potentially much broader range of 
application. Like many civil law jurisdictions,26 German law establishes a principle 
of “good faith and fair dealings” (sec. 242 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) for all contracts. 
Legal acts that run counter to this principle are void. At the same time, the law of 
contracts establishes a general duty to protect the other party’s rights and interests 
in sec. 241 (2) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. Violations of this duty can give rise to 
contractual claims for damages. These general clauses are open to different 
interpretations and are mostly substantiated on a case-by-case basis. 
It is widely agreed, however, that the principle of good faith implies a far-
reaching prohibition of the abuse of rights.27 The prohibition is interpreted in a 
context-specific manner, so that, e.g. relationships of agency and trust give rise to 
a strong duty of loyalty, whereas there are only minimal requirements of consistent 
behavior for transactional contracts.28 On this basis, the abuse-of-rights doctrine 
potentially has a very wide range of applications. 
In banking law, it has specifically been discussed whether the principle of 
“good faith and fair dealings” can effectively enjoin a lender from demanding 
repayment in certain situations. This problem is often expressly framed as a 
question of the “fiduciary duties” (Treuepflichten) of the lender. 29  The doctrinal 
foundation of this argument differs from the common law approach to the extent 
that fiduciary duties are understood as a mere concretion of the general principle 
of good faith. In substance, however, many of the same considerations apply. 
Most commentators agree that even a relationship bank is free to terminate 
the credit line of its customer if the latter is in financial distress.30 However, the 
special “fiduciary” role of the bank limits this freedom in two distinct ways. On the 
one hand, an outright abuse of rights is prohibited: A bank may not terminate a 
loan if the debtor can still be saved by an extension of the credit line, and if the 
 
24  Most notably Hunt, supra note 15, at 775–78. 
25  Thilo Kuntz, Das Recht der Interessenwahrungsverhältnisse und Perspektiven von Fiduciary Law in 
Deutschland- zugleich ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht am Beispiel der 
wertpapierhandelsrechtlichen Wohlverhaltenspflichten und der Geschäftsleiterhaftung, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
KARSTEN SCHMIDT ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG 761 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2019). 
26  On the civil tradition of “good faith” and its role as a “legal irritant” in common law 
jurisdictions, see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
27  Cf. e.g., Claudia Schubert, § 242, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN 
GESETZBUCH paras. 199–202 (Franz Jürgen Säcker & Roland Rixecker eds., Beck 9th ed. 2019). 
28  CHRISTOPH KUMPAN, DER INTERESSENKONFLIKT IM DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT 100-03 
(Mohr Siebeck ed., 2014); Schubert, supra note 27, paras. 236–38 (2019). The details of the 
interrelation of general contract law and the law of agency and trust are much disputed in detail. Its 
existence in principle, however, is widely accepted. 
29  Most notably Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Kreditkündigung und Kreditverweigerung, 143 ZHR 113, 
116 (1979); more restrictively Klaus Hopt, Rechtspflichten der Kreditinstitute zur Kreditversorgung, 
Kreditbelassung und Sanierung von Unternehmen. Wirtschafts–und bankrechtliche Überlegungen zum deutschen und 
französischen Recht, 143 ZHR 139, 159 (1979). On the further discussion, see BANKVERTRAGSRECHT, 
Vierter Teil paras. 137–39 (Stefan Grundmann & Moritz Renner eds., De Gruyter 5th ed. 2014). 
30  Cf., BANKVERTRAGSRECHT, supra note 29, para. 137. 
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termination does not even advance the bank’s financial interests.31 On the other 
hand, the bank may not behave in a self-contradictory way: If –based on past 
behavior– a debtor can reasonably expect his relationship bank to extend existing 
credit lines, these can only be terminated for compelling reasons.32 
The Windstream v. Aurelius dispute falls under neither category. The 
termination of the bond by Aurelius was not outright abusive, as it did make 
business sense for Aurelius to terminate. Furthermore, Aurelius’ behavior was not 
prima facie contradictory as –individually– Aurelius did nothing to cause a 
legitimate expectation on Windstream’s side that the bond covenant would not be 
enforced. Thus, a civil law perspective on the constellation will likely lead to the 
same results as the common law analysis. 
 
B. Within the Group of Bondholders 
It seems conceivable that, by enforcing the bond covenant, Aurelius 
violated a fiduciary duty towards other bondholders. In both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions, the content and reach of mutual duties between lenders or 
bondholders is highly controversial. Much depends on the conception of the legal 
relationship constituted by a group of investors: Is it merely contractual, or does a 
group of investors amount to some form of legal association? In the latter case, 
individual investors are more likely to be bound by specific fiduciary duties. 
1. Common Law 
In common law jurisdictions, it is widely held that investors do not form 
any kind of legal association that would give rise to specific mutual duties. The 
question has been discussed for syndicated lending in particular, where a number 
of lenders contribute individual shares to a large-scale corporate loan. Although 
earlier court decisions have not been unequivocal in this matter, 33  most 
commentators agree that –even in such cases– the arrangement between the lenders 
is “not a partnership, joint venture, or other association.”34 A fortiori, this also 
holds true for the relationship between bondholders, where the degree of 
cooperation between investors is usually much lower than in a syndicated loan. The 
market standard agreement issued by the International Capital Markets Association 
(ICMA) expressly provides –for the underwriting banks (“managers”)– that “[n]one 
of the provisions of this Agreement or any other agreement relating to the 
Securities shall constitute or be deemed to constitute a partnership or joint venture 
between the Managers or any of them.”35 
Nevertheless, there are situations in which a lender or bondholder might 
have fiduciary duties towards other investors. This is most evident when the lender 
or bondholder acts as an agent or trustee of the other investors, a common practice 
for administering the outstanding debt and facilitating its repayment. Standard loan 
 
31  Hopt, supra note 29, at 162–63 (1979); CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, BANKVERTRAGSRE 
CHT,  para. 1266  (De Gruyter  2d ed. 1981). 
32  CANARIS, supra note 31, at 125 (1979). 
33  See Crédit Français Intl., S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 128 Misc.2d 564, 
581 (1985) (holding that a consortium of lenders constitutes a joint venture under New York law). 
34  AGASHA MUGASHA, THE LAW OF MULTI-BANK FINANCING. SYNDICATED LOANS AND 
THE SECONDARY LOAN MARKET para. 5.09 (Oxford Univ. Press. 2007) (with further references). 
35  Int’l Capital Mkt. Ass’n. Standard Form Agreement Between Managers, § 9 (Dec. 2018). 
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documentation often contains a disclaimer of fiduciary responsibilities for these 
functions.36 The validity of such disclaimers is subject to dispute (infra IV). 
With a view to the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute, however, it is most 
interesting to note that courts have discussed the existence of fiduciary duties 
between investors well beyond constellations of trusteeship and agency. Most 
notably, the English High Court in the Redwood case37 discussed whether a majority 
of lenders is enjoined by fiduciary duties from taking a (debt restructuring) decision 
that would be harmful to a minority of the lenders. The High Court held that this 
may in fact be the case – but only if the majority acts in bad faith and thus abuses 
the powers conferred to it. Applied to our case, the result of this “abuse of powers” 
standard is far from clear. When Aurelius used its 25 % share of the bonds to 
declare an event of default and thus triggered Windstream’s bankruptcy, other 
bondholders that had not sufficiently hedged their exposure were disadvantaged. 
But Aurelius’ decision to do so was not taken with the purpose of disadvantaging 
other creditors. Without this subjective element, there is no abuse of powers – and 
thus no breach of a fiduciary duty. 
 
2. Civil Law 
In contrast to the common law approach, civil law jurisdictions like 
Germany consider a lenders’ consortium to be a partnership.38 As a result, they 
transpose the corporate law doctrine of fiduciary duties to the relationship between 
lenders.39 However, most commentators clearly differentiate between loans and 
bonds. Whereas lenders contributing to a syndicated loan are widely regarded as 
forming a partnership, bondholders are not.40 Therefore, fiduciary duties between 
bondholders do not reach beyond the minimum standard prohibiting an abuse of 
rights or self-contradictory behavior. As a result, Aurelius’ behavior is to be judged 
much along the same lines as under the common law approach – and cannot be 
considered to be in breach of a fiduciary duty. 
C. Between Bondholder and CDS Counterparty 
CDS contracts are usually made under New York or English law, based on 
standard documentation by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA). In the ISDA Master Agreement under English law, each party expressly 
represents that “[t]he other party is not acting as a fiduciary for or an adviser to it 
 
36  For example, Loan Mkt. Ass’n., Facility Agreement, para. 28.5, provides that “[n]othing in 
any Finance Document constitutes the Agent or the Arranger as a trustee or fiduciary of any other 
person.” 
37  Redwood Master Fund Ltd v. TD Bank Europe Ltd. [2006] 1 BCLC 149. 
38  For German law, see Carsten Schäfer, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN 
GESETZBUCH, Vorbem. § 705 para. 58 (Franz Jürgen Säcker & Roland Rixecker eds., Beck 7th ed. 
2017); ANDREAS DIEM & CHRISTIAN JAHN, AKQUISITIONSFINANZIERUNGEN – KREDITE FÜR 
UNTERNEHMENSKÄUFE § 31 para 2 seq (Beck 4th ed. 2019); Kai Andreas Schaffelhuber & Frank 
Sölch, in MÜNCHENER HANDBUCH DES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS, § 31 para. 9 (Hans Gummert & 
Lutz Weipert eds., Beck 5th ed. 2019); JENS WENZEL, RECHTSFRAGEN INTERNATIONALER 
KONSORTIALKREDITVERTRÄGE 256 et seq. (Nomos ed. 2006). The question is highly disputed in 
French and Spanish law. 
39  For a critical account of the pertinent German law, see Moritz Renner, Treupflichten beim 
grenzüberschreitenden Konsortialkredit, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTSCHAFT 278, 
285–87 (2018). 
40  E.g., Christian Hofmann & Christoph Keller, Collective Action Clauses, 2011 ZHR 684, 718 
(2011); FLORIAN LEBER, DER SCHUTZ UND DIE ORGANISATION DER OBLIGATIONÄRE NACH DEM 
SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSGESETZ 254 (Nomos ed. 2012). For a rare exception, see PHILIP 
LIEBENOW, DAS SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSGESETZ ALS ANLEIHEORGANISATIONSRECHT UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT § 14 (Jörn Axel Kämmerer et al. eds., Mohr Siebeck ed. 2016). 
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in respect of the Transaction.”41 This is in line with the typical risk allocation of a 
swap contract, where the parties clearly delineate their respective responsibilities. 
There is nothing to suggest that this disclaimer of fiduciary duties would be held 
unenforceable (see below IV), either in a common or a civil law court. 
In March, the ISDA has published a proposal to the ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Definitions that intends to preclude “manufactured defaults” allowing 
investors to benefit from events of default. 42  However, these definitions only 
capture defaults that have been “manufactured” through a collusion of investor 
and issuer – another increasingly common practice spooking market participants.43 
It does not encompass defaults brought about by strategies of net-short debt 
investing such as the one employed by Aurelius. 
At the same time, capital market regulators from different jurisdictions have 
discussed the issues of net-short debt investing and “manufactured defaults” as 
potential instances of market manipulation.44 So far, their inquiries have not led to 
tangible results. Yet it might prove to be an interesting test case for the idea of 
public fiduciary duties of capital market investors. 
 
D. Interim Conclusion 
The Windstream v. Aurelius dispute is a hard case for applying fiduciary duties. 
Although the practice of net-short debt investing might have adverse effects on a 
range of market participants –the issuer of the bond, other bondholders, CDS 
counterparties– neither common law nor civil law consider it a breach of the 
investor’s fiduciary duties. This leaves affected market participants largely without 
viable remedies against the practice. 
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
This Article suggests that we might reach a different conclusion if we take 
the transnational dimension of the case seriously. It argues that the bond market is 
a prime example for transnational private ordering (infra 1). Against this 
background, it outlines a transnational approach to fiduciary law (infra 2). 
Following this approach, it takes a fresh look at the justification and scope of 
fiduciary duties in both common and civil law jurisdictions (infra 3). Specifically, it 
examines the potential of fiduciary law to “enable and bolster social norms”45 
formed in a transnational context. 
A. Transnational Ordering in the Bond Market 
1. Transnational Legal Orders 
The concept of transnational law has always been contested. Until today, 
the discussion is dominated by two opposing camps – as far as the existence of 
 
41  Int’l. Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n., Master Agreement and Schedule, Part 4 (m)(3) (2002). 
42  Int’l. Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n., Proposed Amendments to the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives 
Definitions Relating to Narrowly Tailored Credit Events (2019),  
https://www.isda.org/a/nyKME/20190306-NTCE-consultation-doc-complete.pdf (last accessed  
July 20, 2019). 
43 Joe Rennison, Hovnanian Misses Bond Payment in Controversial ‘Manufactured Default,’ FINANCIAL 
TIMES (May 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/56c729b4-4da4-11e8-8a8e-22951a2d8493 (last 
accessed July 20, 2019). 
44  U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n [SEC], Press Release, Joint Statement on Opportunistic Strategies in 
the Credit Derivatives Market (June 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-106 
(last accessed July 7, 2019). 
45  Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Law and Social Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 798 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
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transnational law is accepted at all.46 On the one hand, there are authors in the 
tradition of Jessup who aim at developing a functional conception of transnational 
law as “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.”47 
On the other hand, there are authors who make the case for a more rigorous 
definition of transnational law, often taking the ancient lex mercatoria as an 
example.48 
The “wars of faith”49 over the existence and nature of the medieval law 
merchant and its potential successors shall not be revisited in this Article. For the 
Article’s purposes it will suffice to acknowledge that there is a cornucopia of private 
ordering mechanisms – with differing degrees of public sector involvement – that 
are not limited to one national jurisdiction. These phenomena can be termed 
transnational to the extent that they transcend the boundaries  
- between national and international law: they are neither creatures of domestic 
nor of public international, i.e. inter-state, law, 
- between unity and fragmentation: they do not form a self-sufficient legal order 
comparable to national legal systems, and 
- between public and private ordering: they are heavily based on mechanisms of 
private ordering, but often rely on public enforcement mechanisms, e.g. 
through state courts.50 
The elements of such orders are well captured by Halliday’s and Shaffer’s 
concept of transnational legal orders (TLO). 51  TLOs constitute functional 
equivalents to state law in the dimensions of rule-making, adjudication and 
enforcement.52 In these three dimensions, they involve legal norms, produced by 
or with legal bodies that transcend nation states and are engaged with legal bodies 
within multiple nation states.53 
2. Ordering the Bond Market 
a. Formalized TLO 
Global bond markets are largely structured as a TLO in this sense. Bond 
issues heavily rely on standard documentation that is developed by industry 
associations such as the US-based Securities Industry and Financial and Markets 
 
46  It is disputed, for example, by F. A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1976); Michael 
Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. 
LORD WILBERFORCE 149 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987). 
47  PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (Yale Univ. Press. 1956); similarly Gralf-Peter 
Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO 
JURIS 260 (2009); Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC'Y 
231 (2016). 
48  Clive M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in 2 CURRENT LAW 
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 129 (1961); Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et "lex mercatoria," 9 
ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 177 (1964). 
49  Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW 
WITHOUT A STATE 3, 8 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). 
50  MORITZ RENNER, ZWINGENDES TRANSNATIONALES RECHT. ZUR STRUKTUR DER 
WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG JENSEITS DES STAATES 215–28 (Nomos ed. 2011). 
51  Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
52  Gralf-Peter Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal Certainty for 
Globalized Exchange Processes?, in TRANSFORMING THE GOLDEN AGE NATION STATE 83 (Achim 
Hurrelmann et al. eds., 2007). 
53  Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 51, at 12–17. Who, however, seem to limit their definition 
to “formalized” legal “texts,” see infra note 58. 
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Association (SIFMA) and the Zurich-based ICMA. Whereas the SIFMA seems to 
play an important role in the market for bonds denominated in US-Dollar, the 
ICMA is the leading standard-setter for Euro-denominated bonds. The associations 
often work together, e.g. on interest-rate benchmarks54 and on standard agreements 
for the repo market55. The structure and function of both associations is similar, 
their membership is constituted by financial institutions from around the world.56 
The following remarks focus on the example of the ICMA. 
Members of the ICMA, mostly banks and other market participants from 
more than 60 countries, work together in a number of committees in order to set 
standards for global primary and secondary bond markets. The ICMA’s Legal and 
Documentation Committee consists of the heads and senior members of the legal 
transaction management teams of member firms. The standard documentation 
elaborated by the committee is intended as market “best practice.” Its real impact 
on market practice can hardly be overestimated. As bonds are heavily traded on 
cross-border secondary markets, bond documentation needs to be highly 
standardized in order to generate a marketable financial instrument that is not 
limited to a single jurisdiction. Therefore, bond-issuers usually stick closely to the 
market standard provisions outlined in the ICMA “Primary Market Handbook” 
when drafting the bond indentures. 
The indentures will invariably contain a choice-of-law clause subjecting the 
bond to the jurisdiction of state courts. However, scope and detail of the bond 
indentures are such that there is usually not much room for resorting to rules of 
domestic law. Rights and duties of the parties are effectively determined by the 
transnational rules that are elaborated and continuously updated by the ICMA. 
To the extent that fiduciary duties are assumed by one of the parties, e.g. by 
the lead manager of a bond issue, they are expressly spelled out in the contract or 
a separate trust deed. If there is no mention of fiduciary duties, there is a high 
probability that the relevant ICMA committees did not deem them necessary or 
conducive to the functioning of the bond market. 
b. Informal Rules in TLOs? 
At the same time, it is important to note that the practice of bond market 
participants is not determined by contract language alone. It is also embedded in 
different layers of relational and social norms.57 These norms are often informal in 
nature. They are thus not clearly encompassed by Halliday’s and Shaffer’s concept of 
TLOs.58 Yet such rules may structure whole fields of cross-border transactions. 
Empirical studies on industries as diverse as the international cotton trade and the 
 
54  Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n., ISDA, AFME, ICMA, SIFMA and SIFMA AMG 
Launch Benchmark Transition Roadmap (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.sifma.org/resources/news/1569 
24/ (last accessed Sept. 28, 2019). 
55  Int’l Capital Mkt. Ass’n., Global Master Repurchase Agreement, https://www.icmagroup.org 
/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateral-markets/legal-documentation/global 
-master-repurchase-agreement-gmra/ (last accessed Sept. 28, 2019). 
56  In the case of the SIFMA and their respective subsidiaries in the United States, see Sec. 
Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n., Member Directory, https://www.sifma.org/about/member-directory/ 
(last accessed Sept. 28, 2019). 
57  On the concept of relational norms, see generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, Relational 
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 3 WIS. L. REV. 483 (1985); on the concept of social norms, 
see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 
21 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 115, 138 (1992); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press 1991). 
58  Cf. Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 51, at 15–16. 
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global software industry have shown the high significance of informal norms of 
cooperation.59 
Most actors in the bond market are repeat players. Global banks cooperate 
in different settings, as managers of a bond issue or as members of a financing 
consortium. In the course of cooperation, they form mutual, or relational, 
expectations of behavior. Many banks active in the primary market are also 
interested in a stable business relationship with the bond-issuer. They know well 
that “continuity [of cooperation] can be put in jeopardy by defecting from the spirit 
of cooperation and reverting to the letter [of a formal contract].”60 Thus,  in the 
words of R. Ellickson, relational norms constitute an effective means of “second-
party control” of behavior.61 
On a wider scale, market participants feel obliged to a number of unwritten 
rules that are considered necessary for the functioning of the market as a whole. In 
Ellickson’s taxonomy of private ordering, these norms can be termed mechanisms 
of “third-party control” as they extend well beyond bilateral relationships between 
market participants and can be enforced by third parties.62 Sometimes, market 
participants comply with the unwritten rules of market practice out of mere self-
interest. In most cases, they simply have nothing to gain from disruptive behavior. 
In other instances, market actors comply with the unwritten rules of the industry 
for fear of retribution by third parties. As in other industries, “black lists” and 
“white lists” are widely used in financial markets to exclude non-cooperating 
players from future transactions. 
Are there any unwritten rules of market practice that might influence the 
legal evaluation of the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute? Empirical research shows that 
creditors almost never accelerate a corporate loan or bond in case of a technical 
event of default.63 They mostly refrain from doing so for fear of a domino effect: 
as soon as one creditor demands immediate repayment, others will follow suit and 
try to take hold of the borrower’s assets.64 Mandatory disclosure of the default will 
further impair the financial situation of the borrower. Bankruptcy then seems the 
all but inevitable consequence. Therefore, creditors usually coordinate in order to 
adapt financing conditions when a covenant has been breached, rather than declare 
an event of default and accelerate the loan or bond.65 But can this – factual – 
standard behavior of bond creditors be regarded a transnational legal norm?  
This question points to the one of the eternal problems of legal theory, the 
distinction between law and social norms.66 From a functional perspective, much is 
to be said for the proposition that behavioral norms become law as soon as they 
are integrated into the communicative structures of the legal system.67 For the 
 
59  For the cotton trade, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). Barak D. Richman, 
Ethnic Networks, Extra-legal Certainty, and Globalization: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in 
CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31 (Volkmar Gessner ed. 2008); for the 
software industry see THOMAS DIETZ, GLOBAL ORDER BEYOND LAW: HOW INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES FACILITATE RELATIONAL CONTRACTING IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE (Hugh Collins et al. eds., Hart 2014). 
60  Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
61  On this terminology see ELLICKSON, supra note 57, at 126–32. 
62  Id. at 126–32. 
63  DANIELA MATRI, COVENANTS AND THIRD-PARTY CREDITORS 115–46 (Springer Int’l. 
Publ’g. AG 2017). 
64  Id. at 130–32. 
65  For empirical evidence see id. at 130–32. 
66  Calliess & Renner, supra note 47, at 262. 
67  Id. at 267–68. 
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purposes of this Article, the question does not need to be answered conclusively. 
Instead, I suggest that behavioral standards in the bond market can and should be 
reflected in the traditional categories of contract and fiduciary law doctrine (infra 
IV.2.b). 
B. Transnational Fiduciary Law 
This approach implies that the transnational legal order that has emerged in 
the global bond market is not an autonomous legal system of its own that could be 
chosen as applicable law under conflict-of-laws rules (infra a). Instead, it constitutes 
and defines the legitimate expectations of the parties that form the basis of fiduciary 
duties in both common and civil law jurisdictions (infra b). 
1. Transnational Fiduciary Law as Non-state Law 
If standard contracts and usages in transnational bond markets were defined 
as a legal order in its own right, market participants might conceivable choose them 
as the law applicable to their contractual relations, based on general conflict-of-laws 
rules. As a consequence, the existence and scope of fiduciary duties would have to 
be discussed solely within the system of these privately made norms. The parties 
would be able to opt out of the relevant state law,68 at least within the boundaries 
of international public policy. 
It is disputed whether a choice of law can point to non-state law at all. In 
the US and UK literature, the question is hardly discussed at all.69 In Continental 
Europe, there has been an intense debate on the matter.70 However, it has been 
largely settled by the EU legislator. The wording of the relevant Art. 3 Rome I 
Regulation and related provisions were put in a manner that limits the permissible 
choice of law to the “law of a country”, while earlier drafts of the regulation had 
expressly allowed for a choice of non-state “rules of law.”71 
2. Transnational Fiduciary Duties in State Law 
Thus, even in a field that is largely determined by transnational legal 
ordering, such as the global bond market, the rights and obligations of market 
actors, including their fiduciary duties, are subject to state law. Yet, as I will argue, 
fiduciary duties under both common and civil law must be defined with a view to 





68  Cf. Bernstein, supra note 57, at 154–57. 
69  Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge 
from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE LAW REVIEW 1209, 1210 et seq. (2005). 
70  Andreas Kappus, “Lex mercatoria” als Geschäftsstatut vor staatlichen Gerichten im deutschen 
internationalen Schuldrecht, IPRAX 137(1993); Stefan Leible, Parteiautonomie im IPR - Allgemeines 
Anknüpfungsprinzip oder Verlegenheitslösung?, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERIK JAYME ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 
485, 490 (Heinz-Peter Mansel et al. eds., 2004); Johannes Christian Wichard, Die Anwendung der 
UNIDROIT-Prinzipien für internationale Handelsverträge durch Schiedsgerichte und staatliche Gerichte, 60 
RABELSZ, 269, 282 et seq. (1996). 
71  Ulrich Magnus, Die Rom I-Verordnung, IPRAX, 27, 33 (2010); Giesela Rühl, Rechtswahlfreiheit 
im europäischen Kollisionsrecht, in DIE RICHTIGE ORDNUNG. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JAN KROPHOLLER ZUM 
70. GEBURTSTAG 187–89 (Dietmar Baetge ed., 2008); Stefan Leible & Matthias Lehmann, Die 
Verordnung über das auf vertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht (“Rom I”), RIW 528, 533 (2008). 
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a. Common Law 
There is no single overarching theory explaining the imposition of fiduciary 
duties under the common law.72 A particularly convincing attempt at combining the 
relevant criteria set out by courts and commentators that shall be explored in this 
Article has been developed by Paul Finn and further elaborated by Deborah 
DeMott.73 The approach has recently gained broader support among courts and 
commentators in Commonwealth countries.74  
This approach argues, in brief, that fiduciary duties are based on “justifiable 
expectations of loyalty.”75 Both the identification of fiduciary relationships and the 
imposition of distinct fiduciary duties rely on this concept. As to the identification 
of a fiduciary relationship, Paul Finn convincingly argues that it implies an 
assessment that “cannot be arrived at by any process of strict legal reasoning:”76 “A 
variable mix of legal phenomena, factual phenomena, presumptions, and public 
policy, guide and structure the judgment made when a character is to be attributed 
to a relationship.”77 
The expectations-based approach is especially fruitful when applied to the 
“non-conventional, atypical, fact-based, and informal fiduciary relationships”78 that 
might be at play in the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute. Conceptually, it ties in with 
the often-cited entry in Black’s Law Dictionary which defines the fiduciary relation 
as arising “whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and 
influence result on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic, or merely 
personal.”79 
It is rare that fiduciary relationships arise alongside an existing contractual 
relationship.80 Interestingly, however, Paul Finn makes the case that specifically 
bank-borrower relationships are prone to give rise to fiduciary relationships: Banks 
“are not charitable institutions” – yet the transformation of bank-customer 
relationships over time, the complexity of financial transactions and the social role 
of banks as performing “vital public services” generate justifiable expectations of 
behavior that are legally protected as a fiduciary relationship.81 
These justifiable expectations also form the basis for the specific duties 
arising out of the fiduciary relationship. DeMott identifies a number of 
circumstances in which an actor has “justifiable expectations of loyalty” towards a 
potential fiduciary: Such expectations may arise “in the course of the parties’ 
relationship over time,” based on “an actor’s evident allegiances,” and in case of 
the beneficiary’s “inability to self-protect.”82 DeMott’s contribution to the discussion 
is both exemplary and particularly important because it –maybe unknowingly– 
indicates how sociological insights can inform the doctrine of fiduciary duties. 
This Article assumes that a sociologically informed approach to legal 
doctrine is desirable to the extent that it allows for a “reflexive law,” i.e. legal norms 
 
72  For an overview of the current debate see Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary 
Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
73  Paul Finn, Contract and the Fiduciary Principle, 12 UNSW L. J. 76 (1989); DeMott, supra note 
18, at 938. For an application of the approach to the field of investment law see Andrew F. Tuch, 
Investment Banks as Fiduciaries, 29 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 478 (2005). 
74  Tuch, supra note 73, 482; DeMott, supra note 18 at 938. 
75  DeMott, supra note 18, at 934-38. 
76  Finn, supra note 73, at 83. 
77  Id. at 87. 
78  DeMott, supra note 18, at 940. 
79  Fiduciary Relationship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The definition has been 
considerably expanded in the 11th ed. 2019. 
80  Finn, supra note 73, at 94. 
81  Id. at 95. 
82  DeMott, supra note 18, at 941–48. 
             2020]            TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW IN BOND MARKETS                 107 
 
 
   
that provide legal certainty and at the same time adapt to the circumstances of the 
social field they regulate.83 Professor DeMott’s approach takes an important step in 
this direction. When she acknowledges the importance of “the course of the parties’ 
relationship over time,” this comes very close to sociological accounts of the 
function of “relational norms” (supra IV.1.b.2). The concept effectively refers to 
the mutual expectations of behavior formed by the parties of a bilateral relationship 
that play a crucial role in transnational legal ordering. 
These relational norms are often complemented with expectations of 
behavior that arise not from the bilateral relationship between two parties, but from 
the common usage of all market participants. A prime example if the effect of social 
“roles:”84 when assuming a certain role, professional or otherwise, or when entering 
into a specific social field, actors are necessarily subject to a number of generalized 
expectations of behavior. A lawyer, for example, is expected to behave in a way that 
is loyal to the interests of her client – because she is a lawyer. In a similar manner, 
bond market participants are subject to a set of behavioral expectations that are 
formed by market practice. These generalized expectations play a decisive role in 
the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute, as will be shown below (infra IV.2.b.2). 
b. Civil Law 
In spite of its differing doctrinal framing, the civil law approach to fiduciary 
duties provides similar “points of entry” for expectations generated in settings of 
transnational private ordering.85  Such a “point of entry” may be found in the 
prohibition of self-contradictory behavior that forms part of the German concept 
of fiduciary duties (supra II.1.b). Similar to the “justifiable expectations” test in the 
common law approach to fiduciary duties (supra IV.2.b.1), the principle of 
consistency may build upon the relational as well as the generalized expectations of 
behavior held by the actors involved. German commentators expressly refer to the 
notion of “justifiable expectations” when it comes to spelling out the conditions of 
the abuse-of-rights doctrine and the prohibition of self-contradictory behavior.86 
C. Fiduciary Duties in the Bond Market Revisited 
What does this mean for the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute? How can 
fiduciary law reflect transnational legal ordering in bond markets? The answer turns 
on the concept of “justifiable expectations” that arguably forms the basis of the 
relevant doctrines in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. At the same time, 
it depends on relationship between formal and informal elements in transnational 
legal orders. The formal rules in transnational standard documentation are rather 
clear on the existence of fiduciary duties of bondholders. They do foresee specific 
situations in which a bondholder might act as a fiduciary of other bondholders. 
These situations are limited to instances where a bondholder expressly assumes the 
role of a fiduciary, e.g. as an agent of the underwriting banks. In all other instances, 
bondholders are restrained by majority thresholds or quorums, not fiduciary duties. 
In our case, the bond indenture permitted Aurelius to act on Windstream’s 
covenant violation because Aurelius held 25 % of the outstanding bonds. Thus, the 
 
83  See generally Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Private Law, 17 L. 
& SOC. REV. 239 (1983). Specifically for transnational law, see Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive 
Transnational Law. The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private Law, 23 ZFRSOZ 185(2002). 
84  DeMott, supra note 18 at 938–40. 
85  On general clauses as a means of “socialization of contract” see Teubner, supra note 83, at 
277. 
86  Dirk Olzen & Dirk Looschelders, in J. VON STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM 
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 242, para. 286 (De Gruyter ed. 2015). 
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formalized bond documentation created no expectation on part of other 
bondholders that Aurelius would not make use of its right to demand immediate 
repayment of the bond (supra II). Quite to the contrary, the imposition of a 
fiduciary duty restraining Aurelius from doing so would run counter to the declared 
intentions of the parties. 
However, matters become more complicated when we take into account 
the informal rules of transnational ordering that are at play here. As market practice 
diverges from the black letter of the contract, so might the expectations of the 
parties. If almost all market participants refrain from enforcing bond covenants 
almost all of the time (supra IV.1.b.2), this will necessarily give rise to the 
expectation that a particular covenant will not be enforced in this particular 
instance. 
Is this expectation justifiable in the sense that it should be legally protected 
by the imposition of a fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duties of loyalty and/or 
care? This normative question cannot be reduced to a –necessarily arbitrary– moral 
evaluation of the conflicting claims of the parties. Instead, it must be answered with 
a view to the functional rationality of the social field concerned.87 That bondholders 
generally make use of covenants only in a coordinated manner is not by chance, 
and it is neither merely in their self-interest. The factual collectivization of 
acceleration rights also serves a broader purpose: it helps bondholders to overcome 
the collective action problem posed by the threat of a creditors’ race. Only if 
bondholders refrain from accelerating their bonds individually, a solution that is 
sustainable for all investors can be found. 
Thus, it seems highly plausible that both Windstream and other 
bondholders had a justifiable expectation that Aurelius would not accelerate the 
bond and cause Windstream’s default. This justifiable expectation has to be 
reflected by fiduciary law doctrine in both common and civil law jurisdictions. 
Conceptually, it can be framed as a good faith duty to act in accordance with the 
interests of the bond-issuer as well as other bondholders – to the extent that these 
interests are substantiated in specific expectations of behavior. 88  However, 
imposing a fiduciary duty on Aurelius to refrain from acceleration would also have 
a positive side effect on the swap market as it would limit the potential for 
information arbitrage for CDS-insured bondholders. 
However, imposing on Aurelius a fiduciary duty to refrain from accelerating 
the bond would mean that the informal expectations formed by participants in 
transnational markets would effectively trump the formal rules laid down in 
transnational standard contracts. As these contracts aim at conclusively regulating 
the collective use of default clauses through majority and quorum requirements, 
they can be considered as a collective opt-out of fiduciary duties. Is such an opt-
out permissible? 
The question is highly controversial in both common law and civil law 
discourse.89 In settings of transnational legal ordering, the question needs to be 
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addressed from a somewhat different perspective. If the purpose of fiduciary duties 
in this context is to preserve the functionality of transnational legal orders, then the 
bar is set high for justifying the imposition of fiduciary duties on individual market 
participants. To the extent that formal rules of transnational legal ordering, such as 
standard contracts, are made and adapted in an inclusive and transparent procedure, 
it can be presumed that all relevant concerns are adequately reflected in the rules.90 
Accordingly, it should be left to the transnational rulemaking process to define the 
reach of fiduciary duties. If formalized transnational rules are silent on the matter, 
they may be complemented by informal expectations of behavior as default rules. 
If, in contrast, they clearly aimed at conclusively regulating the duties of market 
participants, there is no room for imposing fiduciary duties and, through the 
formalized rules of the standard contracts, market participants opt out of the 
default rules. 
As a consequence, Windstream’s claim against Aurelius has to be dismissed 
under both common and civil law rules, as would have to be claims of other 
bondholders. Even though Windstream and other bondholders had a justifiable 
expectation based in transnational market practice that the bond would not be 
accelerated, the relevant transnational standard contracts effectively opt out of the 
bondholders’ fiduciary duties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under traditional doctrines of fiduciary law in both the common and the 
civil law tradition, the practice of net-short debt investing is hard to capture. 
However, fiduciary law doctrine accepts that justified expectations giving rise to a 
fiduciary relationship may be formed not only in the bilateral relation between two 
parties, but also in the wider setting of a market or social field. By translating these 
expectations into legal rights and obligations, it can be a powerful tool for enabling 
and framing private ordering. In this sense, “transnational fiduciary law” stands for 
an approach that seeks to re-interpret existing doctrines of fiduciary law in light of 
the specific problems of cooperation arising in transnational settings. Both formal 
and informal elements of transnational legal orders are thus reflected in the rules 
and principles of state law. 
Under a transnational fiduciary law approach, strategies of net-short debt 
investing may amount to violations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. They run 
counter to the justifiable expectation of bond-issuer and other bondholders alike 
that default provisions in bond indentures are only enforced for securing or 
facilitating repayment of the bond. This informal expectation of behavior may 
complement the formalized rules of transnational standard contracts that structure 
global bond markets. However, market participants may also use standard contracts 
for collectively opting out of fiduciary duties. 
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